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Executive Summary 
This paper examines the annual Medicare acute care hospital inpatient prospective payment 
system (IPPS) rate update rules, which are consistent, comprehensive, and have a high impact on 
stakeholders. I collect a random sample of comments on IPPS rules for fiscal years 2005 to 2014, 
and generate a dataset with information about the types, locations, and expertise areas of authors 
and organizations submitting comments on these rules.  
I also examine the differences between payment rate values in proposed rules and corresponding 
values in final rules, and observe the relationships between these outcomes and the composition 
of public comments across a number of categorical aspects.  
Comments in the sample were predominately submitted by providers (both organizations and 
clinicians), which is unsurprising as these rules directly govern the payments made to these 
groups. Commenters usually had identifiable expertise in the areas of medicine, health, law, 
health administration, business administration, healthcare finance and accounting, public policy, 
or legislative affairs, and were largely concentrated in Washington, D.C., the Northeast, and the 
Midwest. 
There are some discernable correlations between the percentage of comments submitted by 
individuals with certain areas of expertise and changes made to payment rates (both in relation to 
final rates from previous years and proposed rates). A crude interpretation of these relationships 
purports that some subsets of commenters are particularly responsive to rate changes, and that in 
turn CMS is responsive to some of the positions advocated by other subsets of commenters.  
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I. Introduction 
Rulemaking by executive and independent agencies is an extension of the policymaking power 
derived from Congress and the President (Furlong & Kerwin, 2005), and is effectively the “most 
common and instrumental form of lawmaking,” (Kerwin & Furlong, 1992). Rulemaking dwarfs 
legislation in volume. From 1973 to 2013, each Congress enacted an average of roughly 560 
laws (GovTrack.us, 2013). Over nearly the same period, an average of almost 5,000 final rules 
were published annually in the Federal Register (Carey, 2013). Compared to federal legislation, 
rulemaking has more precise and immediate impacts on affected stakeholders: rules often take 
effect within one month of publication, while most statutes require the issuance and 
implementation of rules in order to have a real impact (Furlong & Kerwin, 2005). 
With such substantial administrative power placed in the control of a large, unelected 
bureaucracy, Furlong and Kerwin (2005) note that the participation of the general public in 
rulemaking is a key source of democratic legitimacy. The notice-and-comment rulemaking 
process provides both a mechanism for public input on regulatory content and a mandate for 
agencies to respond to that input. Therefore, the extent to which public views are effectively and 
equitably incorporated into final rules should be a fundamental question when evaluating the 
democratic character of the administrative state. 
Rules governing Medicare acute care hospital reimbursement rates provide a useful and 
substantial case study for examining this relationship between the development of rules and 
associate public comments. Updates to the rates and rate-setting methodology of the Medicare 
acute care hospital inpatient prospective payment system (IPPS) are well-suited for this study 
because they are issued annually, are consistent in form and content, and provide a wide range of 
outcome values. 
Medicare payment rates have enormous implications for the U.S. federal budget, Medicare 
beneficiaries’ access to care, and the U.S. health care system. Medicare spending in 2013 
accounts for 16% of the federal budget (KFF, 2013), and is the largest single payer in the U.S. 
health care system with 23% of $2.28 trillion in U.S. expenditures on personal health in 2011 
(MedPAC, 2013). The majority of Medicare expenditures are for hospital inpatient care, at 
$139.7 billion in 2012; by comparison, the next highest Medicare expenditures were for 
physician services at $69.6 billion (MedPAC, 2013). Acute care hospital inpatient services are 
covered by Hospital Insurance (HI, “Part A” of Medicare), which is financed by dedicated 
payroll taxes on current workers. These receipts are held in the HI trust fund; Medicare trustees 
project that this fund will be exhausted in 2026 under intermediate cost assumptions (MedPAC, 
2013). Of the 5,724 registered hospitals in the U.S., almost 5,000 are inpatient acute care 
hospitals that treat Medicare beneficiaries (AHA, 2013a, 2013b). Medicare insures over 49 
million beneficiaries (KFF, 2012). 
The sheer numbers of beneficiaries, providers, and dollar amounts affected by the acute care 
hospital IPPS rates constitute substantial incentives for stakeholders to involve themselves in the 
rate-setting methodology. In order to secure access to care for Medicare beneficiaries, the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicare Services (CMS) must update payment rates such that they 
Introduction 
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adequately reflect hospital costs. CMS must simultaneously guard against improper payments 
and upcoding (OIG, 2001) in order to protect the trust fund. As a part of its efforts to balance 
these concerns when making adjustments to payment rates, CMS draws upon public comments 
to gain additional expertise on methodology and further understand the potential impact on 
stakeholders. 
This research project will examine the annual Medicare acute care hospital IPPS rate update 
rules, which are consistent, comprehensive, and have a high impact on stakeholders. Specifically, 
I will examine the differences between component values in proposed rules and corresponding 
values in final rules, and will estimate this difference as an outcome. I will examine the 
relationships between these outcomes to the composition of public comments across a number of 
categorical aspects, in order to generate a preliminary estimate of the relationship between rule 
changes and the types of public commenters. To avoid invalid causal assertions, I will restrict the 
scope of this project to a descriptive statistical analysis. 
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II. Background 
NOTICE-AND-COMMENT RULEMAKING 
As required by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), federal agencies are required to provide 
a public notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register prior to proposing or changing a 
rule or regulation.* This notice and the proposed policy that follows are both open to public 
comment for a limited period of time. The agency must respond to all comments when issuing 
the final rule, though it is not required to make any changes to the final rule.† 
The Supreme Court has set a precedent of deference to executive agency interpretation of a 
statute where there is ambiguity or silence, so long as the interpretation is a reasonable 
conclusion from the statute. “If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is 
an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by 
regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, 
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute,” (Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 1984).  
This vast scope of agency power is tempered by the provision that “agency action made 
reviewable by statute and final agency action […] are subject to judicial review,” (5 U.S.C. 
§§704). Schmidt (2002) notes that “effective participation [in rulemaking] compels agency 
decisionmakers to satisfy at least the minimum demands of a firm or interest group or else 
attempt to defend a poor legal case for an alternative regulation.” As all available participation 
efforts in the public record are reviewed by courts when necessary, the threat of judicial review 
serves as a proverbial ‘stick’ to prompt agency responsiveness to interest group concerns.  
Protection during judicial review is not the only advantage that agencies may gain from public 
comments. Those stakeholders closest to an issue (and thus most motivated to participate in 
public rulemaking avenues) are often those with the greatest expertise on the issues. Agencies 
stand to benefit greatly from the topical knowledge of the relevant affected groups when 
formulating rules (Yackee and Yackee, 2006; Croley, 1998). 
                                                
 
 
* 5 U.S.C. §551(4) defines ‘rule’ as “the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability 
and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, 
procedure, or practice requirements of an agency and includes the approval or prescription for the future of rates, 
wages, corporate or financial structures or reorganizations thereof, prices, facilities, appliances, services or 
allowances therefor or of valuations, costs, or accounting, or practices bearing on any of the foregoing.” 
† 5 U.S.C. §553(c) provides that agencies “shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule 
making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation” 
and that “[a]fter consideration of the relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a 
concise general statement of their basis and purpose.” 
Background 
 
 
 
 Put Your Comment Where Your Money Is 8 
 
Finally, the public comment provision appeals to principles of democratic legitimacy. According 
to Regulations.gov (2012), public comments can help agencies respond to public needs and 
preferences, determine public levels of acceptance or resistance of a rule, and understand the 
impact on affected parties. Yet Farina et al (2012) caution that “rulemaking is not a plebiscite,” – 
that the democratic criterion has already been achieved through legislation. The authors assert 
that more participation is not necessarily a useful goal, but that we should strive for more public 
participation of value – specifically by commenters who are “historically undervoiced” and who 
have “situated knowledge” of the potential effects of a rule via personal or professional 
experience. 
EXAMINATION OF THE ROLE OF PUBLIC COMMENTS  
Empirical research articles investigating responsiveness to public participation in rulemaking 
generally employ one of two strategies, each subject to its own limitations. The first makes use 
of a broad sample of proposed and final rules and their associated comments, examining changes 
from proposed rules. This strategy is relatively objective and generalizable, but it also raises 
substantial endogeneity concerns. There exists a wide range of unobservable (and arguably, more 
powerful) factors that influence changes in proposed rules, making it difficult to determine 
whether or not a change was made as a result of a comment (West, 2004; 2005). Moreover, West 
(2005) highlights the difficulty of determining the significance of a change: broader datasets 
challenge the limits of researchers’ technical expertise with respect to the subject matter of the 
rule. Scholars who examine rules covering many different topical areas simply cannot keep track 
of the true contextual meaning of any changes. 
The second prominent strategy is the case study method, wherein researchers immerse 
themselves in particular rules or small sets of rules. Researchers investigate all other aspects of 
the rulemaking process specific to that rule and interview officials and lobbyists who worked on 
the rule(s) under study. This method addresses the causal inference concerns plaguing the 
previous strategy, but its usefulness is diminished by generalizability concerns. West (2005) cites 
Kerwin’s (2003) observation that most case studies on rulemaking focus on rules that are unique 
in terms of their impact and political salience.  
Alternative mechanisms – both informal and formal – for influencing rulemaking exist across a 
full spectrum of interested actors. Furlong (1998) provides a general overview of these 
mechanisms. Presidential influence is exerted through political appointments within executive 
agencies, and through the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Specifically, Kerwin and 
Furlong (1992) highlight executive branch control via Executive Order #12291, which holds that 
regulations must be reviewed by OMB for “consistency with regulatory principles” and that 
major rules must demonstrate a net benefit (as identified by a regulatory impact analysis). 
Congress, beyond its powers of generating the legislation that necessitates rulemaking, can hold 
committee hearings to review regulations; members of Congress may use informal private 
contact with agency staff to exert their own influence. As mentioned previously, courts may 
exercise judicial review of regulations if the validity of the agency’s authority to issue a rule is 
challenged (Furlong, 1998). 
Background 
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Perhaps most significantly, interest groups conduct a number of other activities besides written 
public comments in order to influence rulemaking. These include participation in public 
hearings, membership on advisory boards of agencies, coalition-building with other interested 
parties, mobilization of their members, informal contacts with agency personnel prior to and 
after the issuance of a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) by an agency, and petitions to 
initiate rulemaking (Furlong, 1997). Furlong (1998) mentions capture theory (wherein agencies 
are beholden to the industries they regulate), policy subsystems, and issue networks as models 
for the influence of interest groups on the bureaucracy. 
Only a small number of empirical studies aim to assess the influence of public comments on 
rulemaking outcomes, and consensus is limited or nonexistent among these. Some authors find 
that commenters exert an influence over rule outcomes (Naughton et al, 2009; Yackee and 
Yackee, 2006; Yackee, 2006; McKay and Yackee, 2007), while others find that commenters 
have little to no influence (Golden, 1998; West, 2004). Those finding commenter influence 
tended to look at larger datasets, code content along a scale for regulatory position, and generate 
a mean or subgroup mean for that regulatory position. Those finding little to no commenter 
influence tended to evaluate a smaller set of rules with fewer comments, and evaluated 
statements made by the agency (either via researcher interviews or the preambles of regulatory 
text) about the degree to which regulatory changes were affected by comments. Golden (1998) 
and McKay and Yackee (2007) agree that dissention among commenters plays a role in the rule 
outcome, but disagree on which commenters are more influential: Golden finds that agencies 
tend to be more receptive to opinions that are favorable toward the agency’s position when there 
is dissention among the comments, while McKay and Yackee find that the more dominant 
commenter position has greater influence upon the final change.  
When representing the changes advocated by commenters and the regulatory changes, 
researchers tend to code these outcomes using a 3- or 5-point scale for regulatory shift 
(Naughton et al, 2009; Yackee and Yackee, 2006; McKay and Yackee, 2007). Only Balla (1998) 
captures the magnitudes of the changes to the Medicare physician fee schedule, but he bases his 
analysis of commenter influence on the frequencies of comments submitted by specialty type. 
Golden (1998) notes that there is a dearth of literature reviewing “normal” and “run-of-the-mill” 
regulations. Most research studies look at highly salient rules (which are likely to be more 
prominent in the public eye, and impacted by a number of other factors); notably, Balla (1998) 
investigates only one rule that makes a major, controversial change to physician reimbursement 
rates. 
These studies often draw causal conclusions, and rarely control for outside lobbying and political 
factors. Studies running regression models on the content of comments (Naughton et al, 2009; 
Yackee and Yackee, 2006; McKay and Yackee, 2007), varyingly include controls for rule 
salience, complexity, issuing agency, OMB review, and congressional mandate of the regulation. 
Only West (2004) accommodates an array of other factors into his analysis, but he conducts a 
case study of sixteen rules and uses interviews with agency officials to assess the influence of 
comments rather than look at the comments themselves. 
Background 
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CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS RESEARCH PROJECT 
This research project aims to bridge a gap in the extant literature by aiming for a middle ground 
among the research strategies and techniques employed previously. Rather than restrict the 
estimation of regulatory change to an ordinal scale, using the actual numerical values of IPPS 
reimbursement components can capture more detail in the enacted change.  
Additionally, this project will generate and analyze a dataset that is intermediate in terms of the 
number of rules evaluated (relative to other studies), but large in terms of the number of 
comments evaluated. The rules evaluated are regular, annual updates, and thus fall into Golden’s 
criterion for “run-of-the-mill” rulemaking; moreover, the standardized nature of the regulations 
can accommodate pseudo case study methods. However, these rules are significant in terms of 
stakeholders affected and the dollar amounts involved, meaning that these are highly salient 
regulations. 
Finally, to avoid any invalid causal assertions, this study will endeavor to control for political, 
geographic, and economic factors that may influence the changes made to the rule. Moreover, it 
will not present any of its findings as causal in nature, and will be restricted to descriptive and 
relational statistical analysis. 
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III. Data 
PRIMARY DATA SOURCES AND RETRIEVAL 
Updates to the Medicare IPPS reimbursement rate-setting methodology are provided annually in 
rules issued by CMS. Those proposed and final rules available in a searchable, electronic format 
via FederalRegister.gov are the annual updates to the acute care hospital IPPS rates from 
FY1994 to FY2014. I selected these rules by: (1) reviewing the CMS.gov list of federal 
regulations and notices for the Acute Inpatient PPS,* and (2) by querying [medicare "hospital 
inpatient prospective payment"] in the FederalRegister.gov search engine. I have 
downloaded all CMS-produced documentation – including notices, corrections, proposed rules, 
and final rules – for each annual update. These are listed in Appendix A, along with any 
associated notices and corrections.  
All public comments associated with each annual set of rules, notices, and corrections (herein, 
“rule-year”) are publicly available. Public comments associated with the selected rules are 
available for individual download from Regulations.gov back to 2005. I used the Docket ID 
associated with each rule to query the Regulations.gov search engine, and retrieved lists of the 
comment ID numbers registered with each rule-year docket. As paper comments are grouped 
together as one comment entry, I generated my own list of paper comment ID numbers. I utilized 
these finalized lists as a sampling frame to generate a random sample of the public comments. 
Following Cochran’s rule for minimum sample size (as cited in Israel, 2013) adjusted for a 
small, finite population,† I calculated a sample size for a population of all years taken together (at 
a 95% confidence level), and sample sizes for each rule-year (at the same 95% confidence level 
specification). I did not stratify paper and electronic comments. While the cumulative sample 
size of 370 represents a manageable portion of the total number of comments (5.2% of 7,038 
total comments), the sum of the sample sizes for each rule-year is quite large at 2,226 (31.5% of 
the total comments).  
                                                
 
 
* Available at http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/AcuteInpatientPPS/IPPS-
Regulations-and-Notices.html. 
† A sample size of n (adjusted for the population) is calculated as:  𝑛 = 𝑛!1 + !!!!!  
where N represents the total population, and n0 (the base sample size) is calculated as: 𝑛! = 𝑍!𝑝𝑞𝑒!  
where pq represents an estimation of the variance of sample characteristics, e represents the confidence interval 
precision desired, and Z represents the Z-score desired. I assume maximum variance values.  
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I randomly selected a subset of comments from the intended sample, in order to reasonably 
accommodate researchers’ time and effort constraints. The sample sizes for each rule-year in this 
subset were calculated as proportions of the population sample size, relative to the rule-year 
sampling described above. This stratifies the subset sample by rule-year, oversampling years 
with smaller total comment numbers. Comments in this “first tier” subset were retrieved for use 
in this study, while comments in the “second tier” were identified for potential future work and 
analysis. Table 1 below presents frequency data for population and samples. 
Table 1. Frequency data for public comment population and samples. 
FY Total Number of Comments 
Number and Percentage of Comments Sampled 
First Tier Second Tier (cumulative) 
2005 338 30 (8.9%) 181 (53.6%) 
2006 1,417 50  (3.5%) 303 (21.4%) 
2007 1,817 53  (2.9%) 318 (17.5%) 
2008 124 16  (12.9%) 94 (75.8%) 
2009 902 45  (5.0%) 270 (29.9%) 
2010 474 35  (7.4%) 213 (44.9%) 
2011 639 40  (6.3%) 241 (37.7%) 
2012 295 28  (9.5%) 168 (56.9%) 
2013 412 33  (8.0%) 200 (48.5%) 
2014 620 40  (6.3%) 238 (38.4%) 
TOTAL 7,038 370  (5.2%) 2,226 (31.5%) 
 
The resultant primary, raw dataset includes 10 sets of proposed and final rules, for fiscal years 
2005 to 2014, and a random, stratified sample of the comments associated with each docket 
totaling 370 comments. The comment-level data are representative at the 95% confidence level 
for analysis of the 10-year period of rules, but do not reach this confidence threshold when 
isolated to a particular year. Therefore, analysis on a specific rule-year can only be considered on 
an anecdotal basis, while analysis on the complete dataset can be considered representative. 
EXTRACTED DATA 
I processed and combined the extracted data from the primary sources (proposed rules, final 
rules, and public comments) and from supplemental sources in order to form the following 
datasets: commenter data, containing extracted and inferred information about the organizations 
and authors submitting comments; contextual data, containing rule-year level information about 
the comment period length, political party of the President and Congressional majorities, CMS 
leadership, and growth in health expenditures; and substantive data, containing information 
about the content promulgated in the proposed and final rules (at the rule level). I also planned to 
extract substantive information about the positions advocated by commenters (at the comment 
Data 
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level), but the complexity and time requirements of this task proved to be beyond the scope of 
this project. The creation of these datasets is described in the sections that follow. A summary of 
the consolidated data set is provided in Appendix C. 
Commenter Data 
Three undergraduate research assistants and I accessed each individual comment included in the 
first tier sample. For each comment, we saved the Regulations.gov HTML data and downloaded 
all available attached files. Comment content is either provided as text on the web page or as an 
attached document, depending on how the comment was submitted by its author. We recorded 
the information listed in Panel A of Box 1 below for each comment, when available. 
Box 1. Information collected from comments, matched corresponding data generated. 
A. Collected Information B. Consolidated/Inferred Data 
Primary Author Information 
Position title 
Primary degree 
Additional degree(s) 
Certificate(s) 
Expertise subject areas: 
• Medicine/Health – MD, MSN, DNP, DO, Pharm.D., MPH 
• Law – JD 
• Healthcare/Business Administration & Leadership – MBA, 
CEO, President, Executive Director, etc. 
• Healthcare Finance & Accounting – CFO, CPA, Director of 
Reimbursement, VP of Finance, etc. 
• Public Policy/Legislative – VP of Public Policy, Director of 
Regulatory Affairs, etc. 
Primary Organization Information 
Organization name 
CMS-designated name 
CMS-designated category 
Researcher-inferred category 
Entity category – the type of entity sponsoring the content of the 
comment 
Entity domain – the field/perspective represented by the entity  
Entity type – whether the entity is representing the views of an 
organization or the views of an individual  
Affiliated organization type – if entity type is ‘individual’, entity 
category of the affiliated organization 
Number of repeat occurrences – number of times organization has 
sponsored a comment in the sample 
Constituency/market level – with what location level the organization 
is concerned (e.g., ‘local’ for a community hospital, ‘global’ for an 
international pharmaceutical corporation) 
CMS-designated category deemed correct – indicates that the CMS-
designated commenter category appears to be correct for  
Location Information 
State 
City 
ZIP 
State 
Region – U.S. Census Bureau geographic designation 
Division – U.S. Census Bureau geographic designation 
Data 
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A. Collected Information B. Consolidated/Inferred Data 
Comment Information 
Received date 
Date sent 
Proposed rule date (from rule) 
Comment due date (from rule) 
Days after proposed rule – number of days between date proposed 
rule was issued and date comment was submitted  
Days before due date – number of days between date comment was 
submitted and date comment was due 
Comment format Comment format – indicates whether comments were submitted as 
text or as an attachment 
 
I use the collected information to generate the data presented in Panel B of Box 1 above. 
‘Primary author’ refers to the first author listed on a comment. The author information collected 
is used to generate expertise indicator data, based on the author’s position, degrees, and 
certifications. ‘Primary organization’ refers to the first organization listed on a comment, or the 
first organization affiliated with a primary author.  
In the event that values assigned by CMS conflict with those provided in a comment, I deferred 
to the value provided in the comment. The argument can be made that perspective of CMS 
should take precedent over that of the comment, as CMS is the organization responsible for 
interpreting the comment. However, I selected the comment-derived values because (1) it is 
likely that the individuals responsible for responding to and addressing the comments are not the 
same individuals responsible for cataloguing the comment in the Regulations.gov database, and 
(2) this study aims to describe and analyze the individuals and organizations submitting 
comments on IPPS rules. 
Contextual Data 
I collected an array of contemporaneous data to represent the context in which the rulemaking 
process took place. This data includes factors internal to CMS and the rulemaking process (as 
presented in Table 2 below) and external factors (as presented in Table 3 below).  
Data 
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Table 2. Internal contextual data. 
FY 
Length of 
Proposed Rule     
(pages) 
Comment 
Period Length 
(days) 
Revision 
Period Length 
(days) 
Number of 
Comments CMS Administrator 
a 
2005 622 55 30 338 Mark McClellan 
2006 368 51 49 1,417 Mark McClellan 
2007 477 48 67 1,817 Mark McClellan 
2008 456 40 71 124 [Acting] b 
2009 411 44 67 902 [Acting] c 
2010 607 39 58 474 [Acting] d 
2011 472 45 59 639 Donald Berwick e 
2012 298 46 59 295 Donald Berwick 
2013 324 45 67 412 [Acting] f 
2014 339 46 55 620 Marilyn Tavenner 
a. CMS, 2009; CMS, 2014; Leavitt Partners, 2014.  
b. Leslie Norwalk, Herb Kuhn 
c. Kerry Weems 
d. Charlene Frizzera 
e. Charlene Frizzera served as the Acting Administrator for some duration of the FY 2011 IPPS rulemaking period. 
f. Marilyn Tavenner 
I do not include a variable for the CMS Chief Actuary, as Rick Foster occupied the position for 
all but the FY2014 rulemaking period. I omit those individuals serving as the acting administer 
(denoted by “[Acting]”) from the analysis under the presumption that those individuals not 
confirmed by Congress have a more uncertain expected length time in the office. 
Data 
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Table 3. External contextual data. 
FY President House Majority Party 
Senate 
Majority Party 
Growth in National Health Expenditures 
from Previous Year a (%) 
2005 Bush Republican Republican 8.6% 
2006 Bush Republican Republican 7.2% 
2007 Bush Republican Republican 6.8% 
2008 Bush Democrat Democrat 6.5% 
2009 Bush Democrat Democrat 6.3% 
2010 Obama Democrat Democrat 4.7% 
2011 Obama Democrat Democrat 3.8% 
2012 Obama Republican Democrat 3.8% 
2013 Obama Republican Democrat 3.6% 
2014 Obama Republican Democrat 3.7% 
a. CMS, 2012. 
Substantive Data 
I collected and synthesized data representing the content promulgated via the text of the rule. 
This includes specific numerical data on the standard federal payment base rates and relative 
weighting factors, as well as a summary of major and irregular policy changes implemented by 
the rules.  
The Medicare acute care hospital IPPS rates are established by applying a set of adjustments to a 
standardized discharge amount, which is a standardized base payment amount set for the 
expected costs of furnishing inpatient services covered by Medicare. For FY2014 services, this 
base amount is $5,370.28. Each patient discharge is assigned to Medicare severity diagnosis-
related groups (MS-DRGs), which aggregate similar clinical conditions and associated services 
rendered by the hospital during a patient stay (CMS, 2013a). These are grouped into Major 
Diagnostic Categories (MDCs) that form mutually-exclusive areas, usually corresponding to 
organ systems, causes of morbidities, and particular medical specialties (75 FR 50041); a list of 
these 25 MDCs is provided in Appendix E. 
MS-DRG relative weights are established to reflect the relative cost of one MS-DRG compared 
to the average of all Medicare cases; these weights adjust for the differences in treatment costs 
required for different types of medical conditions (CMS, 2013a). A more detailed overview of 
the IPPS rate-setting methodology is provided in Appendix B. 
A key function of IPPS update rules is to provide the annual updates to the standardized base 
amount and recalibrate the relative weights. CMS issues both a “full update” and a “reduced 
update” to the base operating payment amount, contingent on a hospital’s quality reporting 
Data 
 
 
 
 Put Your Comment Where Your Money Is 17 
 
compliance. Though the base rates are usually raised proportionately in the absence of other 
policy changes, CMS has discretion to alter these proposed updates when issuing the final rule 
(subject to budget neutrality requirements). Moreover, while the relative weights are calculated 
via an established methodology and using real treatment cost data, CMS may take other factors 
into consideration when finalizing these weights (including changes to the calculation 
methodology). 
I retrieved the proposed and final update percentages for the standardized payment amount for 
operating costs for each year, as well as the final update percentage for FY 2004 (to provide a 
reference point for FY 2005 values). I then calculated the differences between the update 
percentages from (1) the proposed rule and the previous year’s final rule, and (2) the final rule 
and the proposed rule. Table 4 below presents these resultant data. 
Table 4. Differences in updates to standardized payment amounts for operating costs, as 
provided in final rules and proposed rules.  
FY 
Δ from Update % in Previous FY Final Rule Δ from Proposed Update % 
(1) 
Full Update 
(2) 
Reduced Update 
(3) 
Full Update 
(4) 
Reduced Update 
2005 -0.10% - 0.00% 0.00% 
2006 -0.10% -0.10% 0.50% 0.50% 
2007 -0.30% -1.90% 0.00% 0.00% 
2008 -0.10% -0.10% 0.00% 0.00% 
2009 -0.30% -0.30% 0.60% 0.60% 
2010 -1.50% -0.50% -0.25% -1.25% 
2011 0.55% 0.55% -0.05% -0.05% 
2012 -0.85% -0.85% 0.40% 0.40% 
2013 0.20% 0.20% -0.30% -0.30% 
2014 0.00% 0.00% -0.10% -0.10% 
All values are reported as differences in percentage points, not as percentage changes. Columns (1) and (2) present 
the differences between the update percentage provided in the proposed rule for the current FY and the update 
percentage provided in the final rule for the previous year. Columns (3) and (4) present the differences between the 
update percentage provided in the final rule for the current FY and the update percentage from the proposed rule. 
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I retrieved the proposed and final MS-DRG relative weights for each year for FYs 2011-2014, as 
well as the final MS-DRG relative weights for FY 2010 (to provide a reference point for FY 
2010 values.* For each MDC, I calculated the average differences between the MS-DRG relative 
weight from (1) the proposed rule and the previous year’s final rule, and (2) the final rule and the 
proposed rule. I also calculated the average and median differences for the same relationships 
across all MS-DRGs. 
A survey of some of the key irregular changes made for reimbursements in each fiscal year is 
provided in Appendix D. I interpret ‘regular’ changes to be standard adjustments and updates to 
existing and recurring components of the payment policies (e.g., wage adjustment index data, 
occupational mix data, direct and indirect graduate medical education payments, new technology 
add-on payments, etc.). 
By far one of the most substantial recent changes made to the acute care hospital IPPS is the 
severity adjustment to DRGs, in which CMS appends secondary diagnosis codes to the DRG 
system according to the level of complications, comorbidities, and excess resource use associated 
with a particular beneficiary’s stay. This new DRG system, referred to as Medicare Severity 
(MS)-DRGs, was introduced for a small subset of DRGs for reimbursements in FY 2006, and 
phased in for the full set of DRGs over FYs 2007 and 2008 (CMS, 2013a). This major change 
may be a key driver of the relatively high numbers of comments received on the FYs 2006 and 
2007 rules (1,417 and 1,817 respectively). 
For FY 2013 onward, CMS began imposing payment adjustments through the Hospital 
Readmissions Reduction Program and the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) Program. 
The first program applies a downward adjustment to the operating base rates for hospitals with 
comparatively low performance on readmissions within 30 days; the second reduces the 
operating base rate for participating hospitals and permits higher value-based incentive payments 
dependent on hospital quality metrics. Both adjustments represent a substantial shift in health 
care reimbursement toward paying for performance, rather than traditional compensation for 
services rendered (CMS, 2013a), and could motivate additional comments. 
Also of note is the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA, Public 
Law 111-148) on March 23, 2010. CMS noted in the FY 2011 proposed rule (published May 04, 
2010) that “due to the timing of the passage of the legislation, [CMS is] unable to address those 
provisions in this proposed rule.” CMS indicated plans to issue separate documents and 
instructions for implementing provisions of P.L. 111-148 that affect the payment rate policies for 
FYs 2010 and 2011 (75 FR 23851). However, despite this explicit circumvention of PPACA 
                                                
 
 
* While proposed MS-DRG relative weights for each FY are publicly available, only proposed weights from FY 
2011 forward is available in a structured format. All final weights are available in a structured format. Manually 
entering the proposed weight data would be a burdensome task: as of the FY2014 final rule, there were 751 MS-
DRG classifications.  
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provisions in the FY 2011 rule, it is probable that the heightened public attention on health care 
payment issues contributed to the moderately high number of comments received for that rule 
(639). 
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IV. Analysis and Discussion 
COMMENTER MIX 
This section provides an examination of the composition of the commenters within the sample 
according to the authors’ areas of expertise and the organizations’ perspectives. 
Commenter Domains 
I use the term “domain” to indicate the field or perspective represented by the author or 
organization submitting a comment. Figure 1 below depicts the concentration of expertise across 
several areas. Providers (both organizations and clinicians) greatly surpass all other submissions 
– unsurprisingly, as these rules directly govern the payments made to these commenters. Health 
care industry organizations (such as device manufacturers, pharmaceutical companies, and 
reimbursement contractors) make up a substantial portion of the remaining comments submitted. 
While these organizations are not directly paid through the IPPS rules, they serve as vendors to 
the direct payees and are thus indirectly affected by IPPS rates. 
Figure 1. Total number of comments across commenter domains. 
 
I further examine this distribution by incorporating the internal and external contextual data 
retrieved for each rule. The distributions of commenter domains for various external and internal 
factors are presented in Figure 2 below. Noticeably, Tavenner presided over a substantially 
larger fraction of industry, government, academic, and public interest commenters (Panel A); this 
may a skewed representation, as she only presided over one year in this dataset. However, a 
CMS Administrator status confirmed by Congress is associated with a larger fraction of industry 
organizations (Panel B). It is possible that Tavenner’s role as the newly confirmed Administrator 
amidst the continued implementation of the PPACA is associated with the changing proportions. 
Additionally, Republican majority position is associated with fewer comments from provider 
organizations and more comments from clinicians (Panels C, D, and E). 
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Figure 2. Share of comments by commenter domain, across contextual factors. 
 
Panel A: CMS Administrator; Panel B: Indicator of Congressional confirmation of CMS Administrator; Panel C: 
President; Panel D: Majority party of the U.S. House of Representatives; Panel E: Majority party of the U.S. Senate. 
Commenter Expertise 
I use the term “expertise” to represent specific indicators of authors’ subject matter knowledge, 
via job position, degrees, and certificates. Of the 370 comments in this sample, 62% were 
submitted by authors with at least one form of identifiable subject matter expertise. Figure 3 
below depicts the concentration of expertise across several areas. Medicine and health, by far, 
dominate the sample, which is to be expected given the distribution of commenter domains 
discussed previously.  
Figure 3. Total number of comments across commenter areas of expertise. 
 
However, given the domain distribution, it is likely that provider organizations possess a large 
share of these other areas of expertise. This is confirmed by examining the proportions of 
expertise across the domains, as depicted in Figure 4 below. Indeed, provider organizations 
possess a majority of the finance and accounting expertise. 
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Figure 4. Share of comments across commenter domains and areas of expertise. 
 
I further examine this distribution by incorporating the internal and external contextual data 
retrieved for each rule. The distributions of commenter areas of expertise for various external 
and internal factors are presented in Figure 5 below.  
Figure 5. Share of comments by commenter areas of expertise, across contextual factors. 
 
Panel A: CMS Administrator; Panel B: Indicator of Congressional confirmation of CMS Administrator; Panel C: 
President; Panel D: Majority party of the U.S. House of Representatives; Panel E: Majority party of the U.S. Senate. 
Noticeably, Democratic majority position is associated with more comments from authors with 
expertise in healthcare finance and accounting (Panels C, D, and E). 
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Constituency Level 
I use the term “constituency level” to indicate the geographic level with which an organization is 
concerned (e.g., e.g., ‘local’ for a community hospital, ‘global’ for an international 
pharmaceutical corporation). Figure 6 below depicts the distribution of comments across these 
levels of constituency. Local constituencies vastly outnumber all other levels, though national 
and state constituencies are sizeable. 
Figure 6. Total number of comments across levels of constituency. 
 
However, despite the overall dominance of local interests, national interests appear to be 
growing in the number of comments submitted in recent years (possibly due to the PPACA) and 
have surpassed local interests. Figure 7 depicts the distribution for each FY. Global and state 
constituencies appear to be represented at roughly the same levels across the decade, though they 
fluctuate from year to year without any specific trend. 
Figure 7. Distribution of levels of constituency, by fiscal year. 
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GEOGRAPHIC MIX 
The distribution of comments across the U.S. Census Bureau divisions is presented in Figure 8 
below (a list of the Census divisions is provided in Appendix F). The South Atlantic division, 
which encompasses Washington, D.C., provides the largest supply of comments, while the 
Midwest and Northeast regions make up most of the remaining portions. However, these regions 
appear to fluctuate greatly over time, as shown in Figure 9.  
Figure 8. Total number of comments across U.S. Census Bureau divisions. 
 
Figure 9. Share of comments across U.S. Census Bureau divisions, by FY. 
 
Values reflect percentage of comments with a known location in the U.S., and do not include comments from 
organizations in foreign countries (count: 4) or comments with unknown locations (count: 16). 
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When drilling down to the total number of comments per state (as depicted in Figure 10), it 
becomes clear that a few areas have a clear dominance with respect to numbers: D.C., California, 
Illinois, and Connecticut, followed by Texas and Pennsylvania.  
Figure 10. Distribution of the total number of comments, for all FYs. 
 
Notably, Washington, D.C. is clearly the driver of the dominance of the South Atlantic division 
in the previous charts, as the nearby states in the division rank on the lower end of contributing 
states. This may be due to both the increased access to information about executive agency 
activities available in the city, and the presence of most national association headquarters in the 
city. 
The relatively large populations of these dominant states may be substantially skewing their 
representation on this map. A per capita adjustment (using 2013 population estimates from the 
U.S. Census Bureau) is presented in Figure 17 of Appendix G. However, even with this 
adjustment, the dominance of the Northeast and Midwest persists, and D.C.’s comments per 
capita value is the highest above all. California, New York, and Texas all fall to the bottom of 
the distribution when adjusting for population. 
Figure 11 below presents the state distribution of comments according to the domain of the 
organization. As expected, most of the providers are located in states with the higher comment 
numbers, as providers comprise the majority of commenters. 
  
1+    5+   10+  15+   20+  
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Figure 11. Distribution of comments by domain, for all FYs.  
Provider (Organization)  Provider (Clinician)  
  
Patient Payer 
  
Industry Academic / Public Interest 
 
Government comments came from California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Tennessee, and Washington, D.C.  
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Figure 12 below presents the distribution of comments across states, by the level of constituency 
or target market of the commenting organization. Local constituencies are spread similarly to the 
total distribution of comments, but national constituencies have loci in D.C., Illinois, and 
Virginia. 
Figure 12. Distribution of comments by constituency level, for all FYs. 
Local State 
  
National Global 
 
 
TRENDS AROUND PROPOSED RULES 
This section examines trends and relationships with respect to proposed rules, emphasizing the 
proposed changes to DRG standard update percentages and DRG relative weights as compared 
to the previous year, and the number of comments received in response to a proposed rule.  
Proposed Payment Changes Relative to National Health Expenditures  
CMS updates IPPS rates with the purpose of compensating providers appropriately for services 
in a given fiscal year. It is therefore reasonable to assume that proposed updates to these rates 
should be responsive to the growth in national health expenditures. I compute an ordinary least 
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squares (OLS) regression estimate for the percentage growth in national health expenditures 
relative to the previous year in relation to proposed changes to DRG updates and weights. I 
report the resultant coefficients from this regression in Table 5 below. 
Table 5. Ordinary least squares regression coefficients for growth in national health 
expenditures. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Δ from average MDC weight in 
Previous FY Final Rule 
0.00930    
(0.0304)    
     
Δ from median MDC weight in 
Previous FY Final Rule 
 0.0325   
 (0.0351)   
     
Δ from Update % in Previous FY 
Final Rule (full update) 
  0.0414  
  (1.120)  
     
Δ from Update % in Previous FY 
Final Rule (reduced update) 
   -0.863 
   (0.739) 
     
Constant 0.0369*** 0.0368*** 0.0551*** 0.0487*** (0.00129) (0.000655) (0.00665) (0.00553) 
     
R2 0.045 0.300 0.000 0.163 
     
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
While none of these coefficients are significant, the sign for the coefficient on most of these 
updates is positive, supporting a general trend of increasing IPPS rates with increasing 
expenditures.  
Only the sign on the reduced update (a lesser base update rate imposed as a penalty for not 
providing adequate quality metrics) is negative. It is possible that as expenditures increase, CMS 
reduces the penalty update further in order to provide some financial relief to itself while also 
making the penalties stronger. It is also possible that these penalties are already intended to 
increase in a scheduled fashion, and this just happens to track with health expenditures (which 
tend to increase over time). 
Number of Comments Received Relative to Contextual Factors 
I explore the relationship between the number of comments received relative to various internal 
and external contextual factors. These OLS regression estimates are provided in Table 6 below. 
Without political control variables added into the regression equations, the signs for the 
relationship between the number of comments and the growth in health expenditures, the 
comment period length (in days), and the length of the proposed rule (in pages) are all consistent. 
Growth in health expenditures is positively related to the number of comments. The length of the 
comment period is positively related to the number of comments, which could suggest that 
commenters take advantage of longer comment windows and submit more comments. 
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Conversely, the page length of the proposed rule is negatively related to the number of 
comments, which could suggest that commenters are daunted by longer proposed rules and make 
fewer comments on these. 
Table 6. Ordinary least squares regression coefficients for number of comments received. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Growth in National 
Health Expenditures 
9,617   11,485 -72,683 -77,021 -79,875 
(9,949)   (15,865) (67,988) (46,404) (57,990) 
        
Comment Period 
Length (days) 
 37.57  15.78 84.74 -11.28 -2.125 
 (37.75)  (51.76) (73.36) (56.20) (81.73) 
        
Length of Proposed 
Rule (pages) 
  -0.281 -1.262 2.598 0.591 0.578 
  (1.681) (2.156) (3.668) (3.149) (3.819) 
        
Obama     -2,288 -1,675 -1,685     (1,802) (1,339) (1,624) 
        
Republican House      -366.8 -402.2      (572.0) (715.1) 
        
Republican Senate      1,990* 2,074      (702.3) (946.7) 
        
CMS Administrator 
confirmed 
      -101.0 
      (497.8) 
        
Constant 174.9 -1,021 826.6 -100.2 819.1 5,660* 5,464 (572.9) (1,741) (756.8) (2,307) (2,313) (2,256) (2,901) 
        
R2 0.105 0.110 0.003 0.187 0.385 0.857 0.860 
        
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Once the dummy political control variables are incorporated into the regression equations, the 
signs move sporadically and speculation on these relationships is no longer possible. 
Types of Commenters Relative to Proposed Payment Changes 
For each FY, I generated the percentage composition of commenters for areas of expertise, 
domains, and levels of constituency. I then estimated correlation coefficients for these 
composition shares and the proposed payment changes. A summary of these correlation 
relationships is reported in Table 7 below, with signs indicating the strength of the relationship. 
In general, a positive relationship indicates that the proportion of comments with a particular 
characteristic increases as the proposed payment change increases (or as both decrease). In other 
words, more comments are submitted as the payment rates improve (relative to previous FY). A 
negative relationship indicates that the proportion of comments with a particular characteristic 
increases as the proposed payment change decreases, or that the proportion of comments 
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decreases as the proposed payment change decreases. Restated, more comments are submitted as 
the payment rates get worse (relative to the previous FY). Essentially, these correlations are 
meant to describe the response of the commenter population to proposed rate changes. However, 
it is important to note that the percentage shares of commenters are by default relative, and these 
correlations may have numerous interpretations. 
Table 7. Pearson correlation coefficient matrix for payment changes from the previous FY final 
rule to the proposed rule, and percentage share of commenter characteristics within the sample. 
% Share within FY Sample 
Difference between proposed value and value from 
previous FY final rule 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
EXPERTISE     
Medicine / Health     
Law   - - - 
Health and Business Administration - - * - - * - - - 
Healthcare Finance and Accounting    ++ 
Public Policy / Legislative Affairs - - * - - *   
     
DOMAIN     
Academic or Public Interest   - - - 
Government   - - - 
Industry     
Patient + +   
Payer     
Provider (Clinician)     
Provider (Organization)   + + 
     
CONSTITUENCY LEVEL     
Global     
Local   ++ ++ 
National - - - - - * 
State   -  
     
* p<0.1. For correlation coefficient r (- -) indicates r < -0.75, (-) indicates -0.75 ≤ r < -0.5, (+) indicates 0.5 ≤ r < 
0.75, and (++) indicates r > 0.75.  
(1) Change from update % in previous FY Final Rule (full update); (2) Change from update % in previous FY Final 
Rule (reduced update); (3) Change from average MDC weight in previous FY Final Rule; (4) Change from median 
MDC weight in Previous FY Final Rule. 
With respect to expertise, there are strong, significant negative correlations between commenters 
with health and business administration expertise and the update percentages (columns 1 and 2), 
as well as between commenters with public policy and legislative affairs expertise and the update 
percentages. This relationship suggests that as CMS proposes more drastic rate reductions, more 
commenters with expertise in these areas make submissions. Also of note are the unilaterally 
negative correlations for commenters with national constituencies (with one strong, significant 
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correlation), which might represent the responsiveness of national professional and 
organizational associations to rate changes that are highly salient for their members.  
The lack of any strong correlations among commenters who are providers (either clinicians or 
organizations) may indicate adversarial interests among the provider community, as through the 
relative weight mechanism (columns 3 and 4) there will inevitably be winners and losers within 
this group of commenters. However, the lack of any strong correlations for the update 
percentages (columns 1 and 2) may counter this point. 
TRENDS AROUND FINAL RULES 
This section examines trends and relationships with respect to final rules, emphasizing the final 
changes to DRG standard update percentages and DRG relative weights as compared to those in 
the proposed rule, and length of time necessary for CMS to incorporate responses to comments 
and issue the final rule.  
Final Payment Changes Relative to Number of Comments  
It is possible that there is a direct relationship between the total number of comments received 
and the magnitude of the revision made to a proposed change, though this relationship lacks any 
nuance. To check this, I compute an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression estimate for the 
number of comments received in relation to the final changes to DRG updates and weights. I 
report the resultant coefficients from this regression in Table 8 below. There is no significance to 
any of these coefficients, nor is there any consistency in the direction of the relationship. 
Table 8. Ordinary least squares regression coefficients for number of comments received. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Absolute Δ from median MDC 
weight in Proposed Rule 
-84,815    
(80,673)    
     
Absolute Δ from average MDC 
weight in Proposed Rule 
 22,358   
 (134,353)   
     
Absolute Δ from update % in 
Proposed Rule (full update) 
  34,455  
  (83,571)  
     
Absolute Δ from update % in 
Proposed Rule (reduced update) 
   -5,274 
   (47,711) 
     
Constant 591.8** 467.9 628.0** 720.7** (125.7) (174.2) (255.5) (235.4) 
     
R2 0.356 0.014 0.021 0.002 
     
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Length of Revision Period Relative to Contextual Factors 
I explore the relationship between the length of the revision period (the time necessary for CMS 
to incorporate responses to comments and issue the final rule), the number of comments 
received, and various internal and external contextual factors. These OLS regression estimates 
are provided in Table 9 below. Though there are not statistically significant correlations, the 
number of comments received remains positively related to the revision period length across all 
regressions, a logical association considering the labor constraints of manually reviewing 
comments. The page length of the proposed rule is usually negatively associated with the 
revision period length; while an interpretation is not immediately clear, it is possible that the 
effects of the page length of the proposed rule are also conflated with the number of comments 
received (as discussed previously).  
Table 9. Ordinary least squares regression coefficients for revision period length (in days). 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Number of Comments 
Received 
0.00204  0.00149 0.00202 0.0163 0.0148 
(0.00788)  (0.00769) (0.00934) (0.0102) (0.0108) 
       
Length of Proposed Rule 
(pages) 
 -0.0442 -0.0438 -0.0421 0.000193 -0.0185 
 (0.0343) (0.0366) (0.0419) (0.0605) (0.0678) 
       
Obama    1.196 -11.23 -5.258    (9.841) (11.63) (14.34) 
       
Republican House     3.734 0.770     (16.52) (17.73) 
       
Republican Senate     -35.11 -22.25     (25.84) (31.59) 
       
CMS Administrator 
confirmed 
     -7.845 
     (9.876) 
       
Constant 56.77*** 77.53*** 76.30*** 74.59** 60.57 69.44 (6.833) (15.43) (17.63) (23.65) (30.68) (34.09) 
       
R2 0.008 0.172 0.177 0.179 0.720 0.769 
       
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Final Payment Changes Relative to Types of Commenters  
As with previous estimates in Table 7 on page 30, I also estimated correlation coefficients for 
the commenter composition shares and the final payment changes. A summary of these 
correlation relationships is reported in Table 10 below, with signs indicating the strength of the 
relationship. In general, a positive relationship indicates that the final payment change increases 
as proportion of comments with a particular characteristic increases (or as both decrease). In 
other words, the payment rates improve (relative to the proposed rule) as more comments are 
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submitted. A negative relationship indicates that the final payment change increases as the 
proportion of comments with a particular characteristic decreases, or that the final payment 
change decreases as the proportion of comments increases. Restated, the payment rates get worse 
(relative to the proposed rule) as more comments are submitted. Essentially, these correlations 
are meant to describe the response by CMS to comments received. However, it is important to 
again note that the percentage shares of commenters are by default relative, and these 
correlations may have numerous interpretations. 
Table 10. Pearson correlation coefficient matrix for payment changes from proposed rule to final 
rule, and percentage share of commenter characteristics within the sample. 
% Share within FY Sample 
Difference between final value and proposed value 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
EXPERTISE     
Medicine / Health -­‐ -­‐  + 
Law   +  
Health and Business Administration + + -­‐  
Healthcare Finance and Accounting    -­‐	  -­‐	  * 
Public Policy / Legislative Affairs ++ ++ -­‐	  -­‐	  *  
     
DOMAIN     
Academic or Public Interest   +  
Government   ++  
Industry   ++ -­‐ 
Patient -­‐ -­‐  ++ 
Payer   -­‐ + 
Provider (Clinician) + + -­‐ -­‐ 
Provider (Organization)   +  
     
CONSTITUENCY LEVEL     
Global    ++ 
Local    -­‐ 
National    ++	  * 
State     
     
* p<0.1. For correlation coefficient r (- -) indicates r < -0.75, (-) indicates -0.75 ≤ r < -0.5, (+) indicates 0.5 ≤ r < 
0.75, and (++) indicates r > 0.75.  
(1) Change from update % in Proposed Rule (full update); (2) Change from update % in Proposed Rule (reduced 
update); (3) Change from average MDC weight in Proposed Rule; (4) Change from median MDC weight in 
Proposed Rule. 
With respect to expertise, there is a strong, significant negative correlation between commenters 
with healthcare finance expertise and the final median DRG relative weights (column 4), as well 
as between commenters with public policy and legislative affairs expertise and the average DRG 
relative weights (column 3). This relationship suggests comments from these experts are related 
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to overall decreases in payment rates in the final rule. Also of note is the strong, significant 
positive correlation between commenters with national constituencies and median DRG relative 
weights, suggesting a greater change to the final rule in relation to the presence of these 
commenters.  
The lack of any strong correlations among commenters who are providers (either clinicians or 
organizations) may indicate adversarial interests among the provider community, as through the 
relative weight mechanism (columns 3 and 4) there will inevitably be winners and losers within 
this group of commenters. However, the lack of any strong correlations for the update 
percentages (columns 1 and 2) may counter this point.  
Interestingly, patients have a slight negative correlation with update percentages, as patient 
comments are associated with decreases in update percentages. In contrast, clinicians have a 
slight positive correlation with these update percentages. These relationships can be very 
coarsely reduced to patient desires to pay less, and clinician desires to be paid more. 
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V. Conclusion 
A few clear characteristics of comments on proposed Medicare acute care hospital IPPS rules in 
the past decade emerge from this analysis. These comments are predominately submitted by 
providers (both organizations and clinicians), which is unsurprising as these rules directly govern 
the payments made to these groups. These comments are also usually submitted by individuals 
with identifiable expertise in the areas of medicine, health, law, health administration, business 
administration, healthcare finance and accounting, public policy, or legislative affairs. The 
majority of comments are concentrated in Washington, D.C., while the Northeast and Midwest 
supply comparatively large numbers of comments. Comments on behalf of local constituents far 
outnumber those of all other constituencies in the total sample, but comments for national-level 
constituencies have begun to overshadow local constituency numbers in recent years.  
There are some discernable relationships between the number of comments received from public 
policy, legislative affairs, health administration, and business administration experts and the 
degree to which CMS proposes to reduce payments, as well as between the number of comments 
received from public policy, legislative affairs, and healthcare finance and accounting experts 
and the degree to which CMS establishes lower payment values in its final rules. This might 
suggest that these commenters respond to the content of proposed rules, and that CMS regularly 
incorporates feedback from these commenters. It might also suggest more homogeneity amongst 
these commenter groups, and any responsiveness relationships present among other commenter 
groups may be masked by heterogeneity of opinions and positions. 
Comments on behalf of national constituencies are also associated with proposed reductions and 
final rule increases – a reductionist view of this relationship could purport that national 
commenters are distinctly responsive to proposed changes, and that CMS is responsive to 
national commenters when finalizing the changes. 
Notably, there is a distinct difference between the content of comments sent by professional 
organizations with substantial expertise, and individual patients. Patients typically submit 
general, subjective, anecdotal statements; Figure 13 below presents the text of a patient’s 
comment as a sample.  
Figure 13. Example of comment from an individual patient. 
I suffer from chronic pain due to Arachnoiditis. I have had a neurostimulator and 
because of it I was able to continue to work for 4 years.  I also have an infusion 
pump that has enabled me to lead a semblance of a life.  Without either of them I do 
not know what I would have done.  It was difficult to get my second pump due to the 
remibursement rates.  Almost no stimulators are being implanted in Louisville because 
of the reimbusement, which is irresponsible of the government and few hospitals are 
implanting the pump for the same reasons.  It is a crime that people that would be 
able to have some dignity and semblance of quality of life are denied it because the 
govenment sees fit to cut the costs. Government employees, such as senators and 
representatives have their own health insurance and would never be denied these items 
because of costs.  They might change their tunes if they had to rely on Medicare and 
Medicaid.  
 
Comments from professional organizations and individuals with visible expertise take on a 
different form entirely, often drawing upon data to present arguments for changes to the 
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methodology. Figure 14 below presents an excerpt from the comment submitted by a hospital 
association. 
Figure 14. Excerpt from a comment by a hospital association with expertise. 
 
 
 
 
The provider organizations very often advocate changes to the methodology for calculating 
payments, and these are usually the types of changes that CMS incorporates into its final rule. 
However, provider organizations, as presumably rational economic actors, have estimated the 
outcome and impact of any advocated methodology change and likely determined that the 
change will deliver a net benefit to the organization.  
CMS may rely on affected organizations to identify methodological mistakes, but these 
organizations are not necessarily incentivized to identify mistakes that help those organizations. 
The small number of comments from patients, academics, and public interest groups, and the 
relatively limited nuance of comments by patients, represents a gap in the representation of other 
indirectly affected parties in the notice-and-comment rulemaking process. It is possible that a 
counterbalance to the check that provider organizations provide on CMS proposals does not 
effectively exist. 
Finally, the lack of clear directional relationships between commenters who are providers (either 
clinicians or organizations) and the changes to payment rates may indicate adversarial interests 
among the provider community. In the advent of restructuring payments and provider 
organizations through bundled payments and accountable care organizations (both CMS-led 
initiatives), it is possible that providers may align their interests and these new relationships may 
make an impact on the commenting behavior of the provider community. 
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This project was originally intended to examine the specific positions advocated by commenters 
in the text of their comments. Due to time and human resource constraints, I could not complete 
this undertaking. However, a deeper investigation into the relationship between the specific 
changes made to proposed rules and the corresponding positions advocated by commenters may 
provide much greater insights into the effective role of public comments in rulemaking. 
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Appendices 
APPENDIX A.  COLLECTED RULE DATA 
Table 11. Collected proposed and final rules, and any associated notices and corrections. 
FY Citation Type 
2005 69 FR 48915 Final Rule 
2005 69 FR 60242 Final Rule - Correction or Supplemental 
2005 69 FR 69536 Final Rule - Correction or Supplemental 
2005 69 FR 78526 Final Rule - Correction or Supplemental 
2005 70 FR 71006 Final Rule - Correction or Supplemental 
2005 69 FR 28196 Proposed Rule 
2005 69 FR 35920 Proposed Rule - Correction or Supplemental 
2006 70 FR 47278 Final Rule 
2006 70 FR 57161 Final Rule - Correction or Supplemental 
2006 70 FR 57785 Final Rule - Correction or Supplemental 
2006 70 FR 23306 Proposed Rule 
2007 71 FR 47870 Final Rule 
2007 71 FR 58286 Final Rule - Correction or Supplemental 
2007 71 FR 59886 Notice 
2007 72 FR 13798 Notice 
2007 72 FR 569 Notice 
2007 71 FR 23996 Proposed Rule 
2007 71 FR 28644 Proposed Rule - Correction or Supplemental 
2008 72 FR 47129 Final Rule 
2008 72 FR 57634 Final Rule - Correction or Supplemental 
2008 72 FR 62585 Final Rule - Correction or Supplemental 
2008 72 FR 66580 Final Rule - Correction or Supplemental 
2008 73 FR 9860 Final Rule - Correction or Supplemental 
2008 72 FR 24680 Proposed Rule 
2008 72 FR 31507 Proposed Rule - Correction or Supplemental 
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FY Citation Type 
2009 73 FR 48434 Final Rule 
2009 73 FR 57541 Final Rule - Correction or Supplemental 
2009 73 FR 79664 Final Rule - Correction or Supplemental 
2009 73 FR 57888 Notice 
2009 73 FR 73656 Notice 
2009 73 FR 23528 Proposed Rule 
2010 74 FR 43754 Final Rule 
2010 74 FR 51496 Final Rule - Correction or Supplemental 
2010 75 FR 31118 Notice 
2010 75 FR 34614 Notice 
2010 74 FR 24080 Proposed Rule 
2010 74 FR 26600 Proposed Rule - Correction or Supplemental 
2011 75 FR 50041 Final Rule 
2011 75 FR 60640 Final Rule - Correction or Supplemental 
2011 76 FR 19365 Notice 
2011 75 FR 23851 Proposed Rule 
2011 75 FR 30756 Proposed Rule - Correction or Supplemental 
2011 75 FR 30917 Proposed Rule - Correction or Supplemental 
2011 75 FR 34611 Proposed Rule - Correction or Supplemental 
2012 76 FR 51475 Final Rule 
2012 76 FR 59263 Final Rule - Correction or Supplemental 
2012 77 FR 4908 Final Rule - Correction or Supplemental 
2012 77 FR 23722 Notice 
2012 76 FR 25787 Proposed Rule 
2012 76 FR 34633 Proposed Rule - Correction or Supplemental 
2012 76 FR 41178 Proposed Rule - Correction or Supplemental 
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FY Citation Type 
2013 77 FR 53257 Final Rule 
2013 77 FR 60315 Final Rule - Correction or Supplemental 
2013 77 FR 63751 Final Rule - Correction or Supplemental 
2013 77 FR 65495 Final Rule - Correction or Supplemental 
2013 78 FR 14689 Notice 
2013 78 FR 15882 Notice 
2013 77 FR 27869 Proposed Rule 
2013 77 FR 34326 Proposed Rule - Correction or Supplemental 
2014 78 FR 27485 Proposed Rule 
2014 78 FR 38679 Proposed Rule - Correction or Supplemental 
2014 78 FR 50495 Final Rule 
2014 78 FR 61197 Final Rule - Correction or Supplemental 
 
APPENDIX B.  IPPS RATE-SETTING METHODOLOGY 
The Medicare IPPS for Acute Care Hospitals was established in 1983 (Social Security 
Amendments of 1983). The acute care hospital inpatient operating and capital-related 
prospective payment systems pay hospitals a “predetermined amount per discharge for inpatient 
hospital services furnished to Medicare beneficiaries” (42 CFR §412.62(a)) that is to be accepted 
as payment in full (CMS, 2013A). Schematic diagrams for the components of the operating and 
capital base payment rates are provided in Figure 15 and Figure 16. 
IPPS payments rates are established by applying a set of adjustments to a standardized 
discharge amount, which is a standardized base payment amount set for “the operating and 
capital costs that efficient facilities are expected to incur in furnishing covered inpatient 
services,” (CMS, 2013A). This amount is divided into an operating costs amount and a capital 
costs amount. These base rates are raised proportionately via annual updates in the absence of 
other policy changes.  
The operating base rate includes a labor-related component and a nonlabor-related component. 
The labor-related share is adjusted by an area wage index in order to incorporate the “expected 
differences in local market prices for labor” (CMS, 2013A). The wage index compares the 
average hourly wage for hospital workers in Core-Based Statistical Areas (as defined by OMB) 
to the national average (CMS, 2013A). 
Each patient discharge is assigned to diagnosis-related groups (DRGs), which form a 
classification system that “groups similar clinical conditions (diagnoses) and the procedures 
furnished by the hospital during the stay,” (CMS, 2013a). DRG relative weights are established 
to reflect the relative cost of one DRG compared to the average of all Medicare cases; these 
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weights are recalibrated annually (CMS, 2013a). These weights adjust for the differences in 
treatment costs required for different types of medical conditions. 
DRG weights are reduced for transfers of beneficiaries to a hospital. Each transfer DRG case 
weight is multiplied by a transfer adjustment factor, equal to the lesser of 1.0 or the ratio of the 
case length of stay to the geometric mean length of stay for that DRG (42 C.F.R. §412.328(c)). 
For extremely costly cases, hospitals are paid an outlier payment that compensates them for a 
majority percentage of their case-specific costs exceeding a specific fixed-loss threshold 
established annually (CMS, 2013a). 
Teaching and residency training hospitals incur higher costs relative to non-teaching hospitals. 
To compensate for these costs, IPPS rates are modified by an indirect cost of graduate medical 
education (IME) adjustment payment. IME payments are calculated for each hospital 
according to the ratio of the number of medical, osteopathic, dental, or podiatry residents trained 
to the number of inpatient beds (CMS, 2013a). 
Hospitals incur higher relative costs when they treat a disproportionate share of low-income 
patients. To compensate for these costs, IPPS rates include a disproportionate share hospital 
(DSH) adjustment. This adjustment is calculated relative to the disproportionate patient 
percentage (DPP, equal to the sum of the percentage of Medicare inpatient days attributable to 
patients eligible for both Part A of Medicare and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and the 
percentage of total patient days attributable to patients eligible for Medicaid but not Part A). 
Hospitals qualify for DSH adjustment if they exceed a specified DPP threshold, with some 
special exceptions (CMS, 2013a). 
Hospitals utilizing new medical services and technologies that are demonstrated to be 
inadequately paid under the IPPS can receive a new technology add-on payment equal to a 
percentage of the marginal factor costs of the new technology in excess of the DRG payment 
(CMS, 2013b). 
The readmissions adjustment amount and the hospital value-based purchasing adjustment 
amount will not be included in this study, as they were introduced to the IPPS rate methodology 
in 2012 (CMS, 2013a). The transfer adjustment factor and the new technology add-on payment 
are not likely to be selected for use in this study, as both represent calculations based on simple 
ratios and are unlikely to change. Additionally, the DSH and IME adjustments are issued by 
provider, and may be beyond the scope of this project. 
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Figure 15. Acute Care Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment System Operating Base 
Payment Rate. 
	  
Source: CMS, 2013a. 
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Figure 16. Acute Care Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment System Capital Base Payment 
Rate. 
	  
	  Source: CMS, 2013a. 
APPENDIX C.  SUMMARY OF VARIABLES IN DATASET 
Table 12. Summary of variables in consolidated dataset. 
Category Variable Type Possible Values / Range 
Expertise Medicine/Health Binary 1 if yes 
Expertise Law Binary 1 if yes 
Expertise Healthcare/Business 
Administration & Leadership 
Binary 1 if yes 
Expertise Healthcare Finance & Accounting Binary 1 if yes 
Expertise Public Policy/Legislative Binary 1 if yes 
Perspective Entity domain Categorical Academic or public interest 
Government 
Industry 
Patient 
Payer  
Provider (clinician) 
Provider (organization) 
Unknown 
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Category Variable Type Possible Values / Range 
Perspective Entity category Categorical Academic 
Association - Advocacy 
Association – Health Plan 
Association – Health System 
Association – Hospital 
Association – Industry 
Association – Professional 
Government – Federal 
Government – Local 
Government – State 
Health Plan 
Individual – Advocate 
Individual – Patient 
Individual – Patient’s Family 
Member 
Individual – Unknown 
Industry – Device 
Industry – Drug 
Industry – Drug and Device 
Industry – Health Care 
Industry – Law Firm 
Industry – Media 
Provider (Clinician) – Health 
Care Professional 
Provider (Clinician) – Health 
Care Student 
Provider (Clinician) – Nurse 
Provider (Clinician) – Nurse 
Practitioner 
Provider (Clinician) – 
Pharmacist 
Provider (Clinician) – 
Physician 
Provider (Organization) – 
Critical Access Hospital 
Provider (Organization) – 
Health System 
Provider (Organization) – 
Home Health 
Provider (Organization) – 
Hospital 
Provider (Organization) – 
Long-term Care Facility 
Provider (Organization) – 
Psychiatric Hospital 
Perspective Entity type Categorical Individual 
Organization 
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Category Variable Type Possible Values / Range 
Perspective Affiliated organization category Categorical  
(only used when 
entity type is 
‘individual’) 
[same options as entity 
category] 
Perspective Number of occurrences Ordinal 1 to N 
Perspective Proper CMS designation Binary 1 if yes 
Location State Categorical 50 US states 
Location Division Categorical New England 
Middle Atlantic 
East North Central 
West North Central 
South Atlantic 
East South Central 
West South Central 
Mountain 
Pacific 
Location Region Categorical Northeast 
Midwest 
South 
West 
Location Level of constituency/market Categorical Local 
State 
National 
Global 
Submission Days after proposed rule Ordinal 0 to N 
Submission Days before due date Ordinal 0 to N 
Submission Comment format Categorical Text 
Attachment 
Internal context Comment Period Length (days) Ordinal 30 to N 
Internal context Revision Period Length (days) Ordinal 1 to N 
Internal context Length of Proposed Rule (pages) Ordinal 1 to N 
Internal context Number of Comments Ordinal 1 to N 
External context Growth in National Health 
Expenditures from Previous Year 
Continuous 0 to N% 
External context Presidential Party Categorical Republican 
Democrat 
External context House Majority Party Categorical Republican 
Democrat 
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Category Variable Type Possible Values / Range 
External context Senate Majority Party Categorical Republican 
Democrat 
Internal context CMS Administrator Categorical Mark McClellan 
Donald Berwick 
Marilyn Tavenner 
Substantive Difference between proposed base 
rate (full) update and that of 
previous FY final rule 
Continuous -M to N percentage points 
Substantive Difference between proposed base 
rate (reduced) update and that of 
previous FY final rule 
Continuous -M to N percentage points 
Substantive Difference between final rule base 
rate (full) update and that of 
proposed rule 
Continuous -M to N percentage points 
Substantive Difference between final rule base 
rate (reduced) update and that of 
proposed rule 
Continuous -M to N percentage points 
Substantive Average difference between final 
rule MS-DRG relative weight and 
that of proposed rule (FYs 2011-
2014 only) 
Continuous -M to N 
Substantive Average difference between 
proposed MS-DRG relative weight 
and that of previous FY final rule 
(FYs 2011-2014 only) 
Continuous -M to N 
Substantive Median difference between final 
rule MS-DRG relative weight and 
that of proposed rule (FYs 2011-
2014 only) 
Continuous -M to N 
Substantive Median difference between 
proposed MS-DRG relative weight 
and that of previous FY final rule 
(FYs 2011-2014 only) 
Continuous -M to N 
Substantive Average difference between final 
rule MS-DRG relative weight and 
that of proposed rule (FYs 2011-
2014 only), for each MDC 
Continuous -M to N 
(For each of 26 MDCs) 
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Category Variable Type Possible Values / Range 
Substantive Average difference between 
proposed MS-DRG relative weight 
and that of previous FY final rule 
(FYs 2011-2014 only), for each 
MDC 
Continuous -M to N 
(For each of 26 MDCs) 
a. “Base rate” refers to the standardized amount for operating costs, used as the basis for the calculation of the IPPS 
payment.  
b. The update is a percentage, therefore the difference between the percentage updates for various FYs and rules is 
reported as a percentage point difference, and not as a percentage difference. 
APPENDIX D.  MAJOR AND IRREGULAR CHANGES TO IPPS SYSTEM 
A survey of some of the key irregular changes made for reimbursements in each fiscal year is 
provided in Box 2 below. I interpret ‘regular’ changes to be standard adjustments and updates to 
existing and recurring components of the payment policies, such as: geographic reclassifications, 
wage adjustment index data, occupational mix data, direct and indirect graduate medical 
education payments, new technology add-on payments, sole community hospitals (SCH), 
Medicare disproportionate share hospitals (DSH), Medicare-dependent hospitals (MDH), low-
volume hospitals, outlier cost fixed-loss thresholds, and transfer adjustments. 
Box 2. Major irregular changes to acute care hospital IPPS rate rules. Sources other than the 
text of the rules are noted. 
FY2005 IPPS Rates 
Implementation of reduction in annual update for hospitals failing to submit quality data Error! Reference source 
not found. 
FY2006 IPPS Rates 
First severity adjustment for small subset of DRGs Error! Reference source not found. 
Changes to criteria for transfer adjustment application to DRGs Error! Reference source not found. 
FY2007 IPPS Rates 
Changes to measures for Reporting of Hospital Quality Data for Annual Hospital Payment Update 
(RHQDAPU) for full annual update factor eligibility Error! Reference source not found. 
Severity refinements to CMS DRGs to generate MS-DRGs; implemented via partial weighting adjustment 
in FY 2007 
FY2008 IPPS Rates 
Implementation of preventable Hospital Acquired Conditions (HACs) that are ineligible for higher payment 
rates Error! Reference source not found. 
Complete implementation of MS-DRG system c 
Reduction in document and coding payment adjustments Error! Reference source not found. 
Appendices 
 
 
 
 Put Your Comment Where Your Money Is 48 
 
FY2009 IPPS Rates 
Changes to measures for Reporting of Hospital Quality Data for Annual Hospital Payment Update 
(RHQDAPU) for full annual update factor eligibility Error! Reference source not found. 
Addition of new preventable Hospital Acquired Conditions (HACs) that are ineligible for higher payment 
rates Error! Reference source not found. 
Revisions to new MS-DRG system, including addressing charge compression issues in calculation of 
relative weights 
Changes to policies about disclosure of physician ownership and/or investment interests in hospitals 
FY2010 IPPS Rates 
Changes to measures for Reporting of Hospital Quality Data for Annual Hospital Payment Update 
(RHQDAPU) for full annual update factor eligibility Error! Reference source not found. 
Changes to mandatory prerequisite thresholds for Rural Referral Center eligibility Error! Reference source not 
found. 
FY2011 IPPS Rates 
Increases maximum threshold for Low Volume Hospital payment adjustment eligibility  
FY2012 IPPS Rates 
Finalization of rules regarding implementation of Readmissions Reduction program  
Establishing rules for the Value-Based Purchasing program Error! Reference source not found. 
FY2013 IPPS Rates 
Implementation of first payment adjustments under the Readmissions Reduction program  
Implementation of first value-based incentive payments under the Value-Based Purchasing program  
Expires Medicare-Dependent Hospital status  
Restores original maximum threshold for Low-Volume Hospital payment adjustment eligibility Error! Reference 
source not found. 
Reduction of measures for the Hospital Inpatient Quality Reporting Program (HIQRP)  
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FY2014 IPPS Rates 
Disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payment reductions and other policy changes mandated by the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) Error! Reference source not found. 
Time-based guidelines for inpatient admission status Error! Reference source not found. 
New measures for the Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) program, the Readmissions Reduction program, 
and the Hospital Acquired Condition (HAC) Reduction program Error! Reference source not found. 
a. Alston Bird, LLC, 2005. 
b. Cerner, 2007 
c. CMS, 2013a. 
d. Health Leaders Media, 2008. 
e. Premier, 2009. 
f. SunStone, 2012. 
g. Wisconsin Hospital Association, 2011. 
h. Florida Hospital Association, 2013.  
APPENDIX E.  MAJOR DIAGNOSTIC CATEGORIES 
The 25 Major Diagnostic Categories (MDCs) are provided in Table 13 below. As of FY 2014, 
there were also 15 MS-DRGs designated as Pre-MDCs (for cases directly assigned on the basis 
of ICD-9-CM procedure codes), and 11 ungrouped MS-DRGs. 
Table 13. Descriptions of Major Diagnostic Categories (MDCs) 
MDC  MDC Description 
1 Diseases and Disorders of the Nervous System 
2 Diseases and Disorders of the Eye 
3 Diseases and Disorders of the Ear, Nose, Mouth, and Throat 
4 Diseases and Disorders of the Respiratory System 
5 Diseases and Disorders of the Circulatory System 
6 Diseases and Disorders of the Digestive System 
7 Diseases and Disorders of the Hepatobiliary System and Pancreas 
8 Diseases and Disorders of the Musculoskeletal System and Connective Tissue 
9 Diseases and Disorders of the Skin, Subcutaneous Tissue and Breast 
10 Endocrine, Nutritional and Metabolic Diseases and Disorders 
11 Diseases and Disorders of the Kidney and Urinary Tract 
12 Diseases and Disorders of the Male Reproductive System 
13 Diseases and Disorders of the Female Reproductive System 
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MDC  MDC Description 
14 Pregnancy, Childbirth, and the Puerperium 
15 Newborns and Other Neonates with Conditions Originating in the Perinatal Period 
16 Diseases and Disorders of the Blood and Blood Forming Organs and Immunological Disorders 
17 Myeloproliferative Diseases and Disorders and Poorly Differentiated Neoplasms 
18 Infectious and Parasitic Diseases (Systemic or Unspecified Sites) 
19 Mental Diseases and Disorders 
20 Alcohol/Drug Use and Alcohol/Drug Induced Organic Mental Disorders 
21 Injuries, Poisonings, and Toxic Effects of Drugs 
22 Burns 
23 Factors Influencing Health Status and Other Contacts with Health Services 
24 Multiple Significant Trauma 
25 Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infections 
Source: 75 FR 50041 
APPENDIX F.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU DIVISIONS 
Table 14. U.S. Census Bureau Divisions 
Region Division States 
West Pacific Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington  
West Mountain Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming  
South West South Central Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas 
South East South Central Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee 
South 
South Atlantic 
Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, 
Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West 
Virginia  
Midwest West North Central Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota 
Midwest East North Central Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin 
Northeast Middle Atlantic New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania 
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Region Division States 
Northeast New England Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont  
 Source: U.S. Census Bureau 
APPENDIX G.  ADDITIONAL GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION MAPS 
Figure 17. Distribution of the total number of comments per capita, for all FYs. 
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Figure 18. Distribution of organizations submitting more than one comment, for all FYs. 
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Figure 19. Distribution of commenter expertise (all types), for all FYs. 
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Figure 20. Distribution of commenter expertise types, for all FYs.  
Medicine / Health Public Policy / Legislative Affairs / Law 
  
Health and Business Administration Healthcare Finance and Accounting 
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